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Abstract
Cockpit Task Management involves the initiation, monitoring prioritization, allocation of resources to, and
termination of multiple, concurrent tasks. As aircrews have more tasks to attend to, due to reduced crew
sizes and the increased complexity of aircraft and of the air transportation system, CTM will become a more
critical factor in aviation safety. It is clear that many aviation accidents and incidents can be satisfactorily
explained in terms of CTM errors, and it is likely that more accidents induced by poor CTM practivce will
occur in the future unless the issue is properly addressed.
Our first step in understanding and facilitating CTM behavior has been the development of a preliminary,
normative theory of CTM which identifies several important CTM functions. From this theory some
requirements for pilot-vehicle interfaces have been developed which we believe will facilitate CTM. We have
developed one prototype PVI which improves CTM performance and are currently engaged in a research
program aimed at developing a better understanding of CTM and facilitating CTM performance through
better equipment and procedures.
Introduction
Air travel is one of the safest forms of transportation, yet each year hundreds of lives and millions of dollars
are lost due to air crashes. Accident investigations reveal that over half of these accidents are attributable to
errors by the cockpit crew INagel, 1988].
Since crew-induced accidents are rare, the "remedy" has historically been to provide specific fixes for specific
causes of specific accidents. For example, ground proximity warning systems were developed in response to a
(small) number of controlled flight into terrain accidents. And yaw dampers were installed in response to
incidents of Dutch roll, an instability problem characteristic of swept-wing aircraft.
This may have led to what Wiener [1987] calls the "one-box-at-a time" approach to cockpit automation that
ignores the need for information and control integration in the cockpit, leaving that integration entirely to the
already overburdened alrcrew. Responses to specific incidents and problems do not necessarily decrease the
lildihood of other incidents and problems. Unless a more general approach to understanding cockpit
operations and problems is adopted, it is likely that the trend will continue, perhaps with catastrophic results.
A systems engineering approach to this problem is more desirable than the ad hoc methods now so
commonly used. As Sheridan points out [1988], the systems approach provides more precise methods of
problem formulation, a basis for simulation and qualitative understanding of systems, a basis for quantitative
prediction of system behavior, an accounting framework for design and evaluation, and a language for
archival description.
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Our own application of systems engineering methods to cockpit operations, has led us to a concept we call
Cockpit Task Management (CTM). CTM involves the formulation of goals, the definition of tasks to achieve
those goals, and the management and execution of those tasks in a dynamic environment until the goals are
achieved. The remainder of this paper presents some background def'mitions, a preliminary, informal version
of a normative theory of CTM, some guidelines for the design of pilot-vehicle interfaces to facilitate good
CTM, and a summary of our continuing efforts to improve CTM.
Def'mitions
A dynamic system is an entity which may be described in terms of input, output, and state. Input is matter,
energy, or information having a net flow into the system. Output is net flow of matter, energy, or information
out of the system. State is a compact representation of the history of the system which makes possible the
prediction of future outputs and of state itself [Padulo and Arbib, 19741. Input, output, and state may each be
decomposed into multiple components. For example, an aircraft is a system whose input components include
fuel flow, control yoke movements, and radio clearances from air traffic control (ATC). Aircraft outputs
include fuel combustion products, heat and noise, and requests for and acknowledgments of ATC clearances.
Aircraft state components include position and altitude, flap angles, and radar mode.
Two systems which are connected by inputs and outputs form a more complex system called a su0ersvstem.
The supersystem's inputs are the unconnected inputs of the simpler systems. Its outputs are the unconnected
outputs. The state of the supersystem is def'med by the combined states of the original systems. Through
successive system connections, systems of arbitrary scope and complexity may be det'med. If a system is
formed from simpler systems through input-output connections, the simpler systems are called _.
For example, an aircraft system can be defined as a collection of powerplant, electrical, hydraulic, and avionic
systems. With respect to the powerplant system, the aircraft may be considered a supersystem. From the
perspective of the aircraft system, the powerpiant may be considered a subsystem.
The use of the generic terms system, subsystem, and supersystem, rather than terms like equipment and
components, permits the examination of domains from many levels of abstraction. Along with this flexibility,
though, comes the potential for ambiguity and confusion. For example, a discussion in which the term
"system" was applied to that combination of people, machines, policies and procedures called the air traffic
control system as well as to a light emitting diode on an aircraft instrument panel would be problematic
without further clarification. For any flame of reference, the analyst must clearly identify the levels of
abstraction to which the terms "system," "subsystem," and "supersystem" apply.
A system beha_or is a (perhaps continuous) series of system input, state, and output values over a time
interval. For example, as an airliner flies from Eugene, Oregon to San Francisco, successive values of input
components (including the pilot's movement of the control yoke), state components (including position) and
output components (including radio transmissions) over the time interval of the flight constitute a behavior of
that system. A system exhibits a behavior if observations of the system yield input, state, and output values
exactly matching those of the behavior.
An event is a set of system behaviors in which some state component changes in a significant way at the very
end of the time interval. For example, reada 10,000 feet is an event consisting of a set of aircraft behaviors.
In each behavior of this event the aircraft's altitude increases, reaching a value of 10,000 feet at the end of
the behavior's time interval. An event occurs if the system exhibits a behavior which is contained in the event
set.
A _ for a system is defined by a set of desired behaviors and a state. Each behavior begins with an
initiating event and ends with a terminating event. In any behavior of the system, if the initiating event has
not occurred, the state of the goal is latent. If the initiating event is imminent, the goal is pending. If the
initiating event has occurred but the terminating event has not occurred and the actual behavior matches the
initial portion of some desired behavior, the state of the goal is active. If the initiating event has occurred, the
terminating event has occurred, and the actual behavior through the time of the terminating event matches
one of the goal behaviors, the state of the goal is _ If the initating event has occurred but the actual
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behavior does not match any of the goal behaviors, the state of the goal is violated.
A goal's initiating event defines the conditions under which the goal is relevant. A typical flight path consists
of a series of waypoints which are geographical points along the route that serve as intermediate destinations.
So a goal to arrive at waypoint 8 is relevant after an arrive at waypolnt 7 event has occurred. On the other
hand, a terminating event may take on more than one meaning, as discussed below.
Formally, only one type of goal is necessary. As a practical matter however, goals may be classified as to
intent and interpretation. In an attainment goal, the terminating event results in some desired state of the
system and the intervening input, state, and output values are unimportant. For example a gear down and
locked goal could be def'med by all possible behaviors terminated with an event resulting in the landing gear
being in the down and locked state. In this case, it does not matter how the landing gear is lowered (by
motor, gravity, or manual operation). Only the final state is important.
In a maintenance goal, it is the portion of the behavior between the initiating and terminating events that is
important. For example, a goal to maintain approach speed until touchdown might be defined by the
collection of all behaviors in which the aircraft's speed was within five knots of the approach speed specified
in the aircraft operations manual, until touchdown occurred. Here, the immediate objective of this specific
goal is not touchdown on the runway, it is maintaining the proper airspeed until touchdown occurs. Put
another way, a maintenance goal reflects a set of constraints on system behavior which are active until some
event occurs.
A constrained attainment goal is an attainment goal in which the intervening behaviors are important. For
example, a goal to arrive at destination area (via waypoints 1, 2, and 3) might be def'med by a set of
behaviors in which the aircraft flies from its origin to waypoint 1, to waypoint 2, to waypoint 3, and ends in
the area of the destination airport.
A _ of a goal is a set of behaviors consistent with those of the goal, but restricted in time and/or in
scope. A goal may be decomposed into a set of subgoals, which are goals consistent with the original goal but
restricted in some way. Serial subgoals are def'med for the original system, but over distinct time subintervals.
Parallel subgoals are def'med over the entire time interval, yet are defined for subsystems of the original
system. A goal may also be decomposed into a combination of serial and parallel subgoals. For example, a
goal to approach the destination airport and arrive at landing position (prior to final approach) could be
decomposed into serial cleared to approach waypoint and at approach waypoint subgoals and parallel
approach flaps, approach power, and approach speed subgoals.
A goal and all of its subgoals form a hierarchy with the goal at the apex. The topmost goal for a flight
mission will be referred to as the mission goal. Part of a simplified goal hierarchy for a flight mission is
shown in Figure 1.
Goal _ reflects an ordering of a set of goals and/or subgoals, as determined by the relative importance
assigned to them by the aircrew. More important goals have higher priorities. For example, a goal to remain
clear of terrain and other aircraft established to maintain the safety of the aircraft and its passengers is
clearly more important than a goal to maintain _+ 20 degrees roll, established for passenger comfort. The
first goal should then have a higher priority than the second.
Performance is how well a system achieves a specific goal. A performance measure is a function that maps a
goal and a system behavior to a value set. The simplest performance measure may take on just two values:
"satisfactory" if the goal is achieved (or at least not yet violated), and "unsatisfactory" otherwise. More
complex performance measures may map to amore complex, ordered set. For example, a goal to maintain
10000 feet may be achieved if the aircraft's altitude stays between 9,900 and 10,I00 feet. But a behavior in
which the maximum deviation was no more than 25 feet might be preferred to a behavior in which the
maximum deviation was 75 feet. In this ease, we could say that the system performed better when exhibiting
the + 25 foot behavior than when exhibiting the _+ 75 foot behavior.
A task is a process completed to cause a system to achieve a goal. A task involves the behaviors of one or
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more secondary systems or subsystems in order to produce inputs to the primary system to achieve the goal.
For example, for the goal to arrive at waypoinlt 7, there must be a fly to waypolnt 7 task. The pilot, the
primary flight controls, the cockpit displays, the electrical system, and the engines are just a few of the
secondary systems required to complete the fly to waypoint 7 task to achieve the goal for the primary system
(the aircraft) to arrive at waypoint 7.
(_Mlsslon a ompieted
Figure 1: Part of a Simple Goal Hierarchy
Like a goal, a task has state. A task is Iatent if its goal is latent, _ if its goal is pending, and active if its
goal is active. A task is in protyress if inputs to the primary system are being applied to achieve the goal. If
the task has been in progress but inputs to the primary system to achieve the goal have been suspended, the
task is _. A task may be _ if its goal is achieved, if the goal is not achievable, or if the
goal becomes irrelevant. In the case of an unsuccessful termination, the task is considered to be aborted.
The performance of a task is simply the performance of the system with respect to the task's goal while the
task is being completed. A pilot keeping the aircraft within 25 feet of a selected altitude is performing a
maintain altitude task better than one only keeping within 75 feet of the selected altitude.
As we can decompose the goal to approach the airport and arrive at landing position into cleared to
approach wayIm/nt and at approach waypoint subgoals, an approach task could be decomposed into get
approach clearance and fly to approach waypoint subtasks.
An _ defines an ordered set of tasks to be completed during a mission. Each task is defined to achieve
a specific goal and becomes active when the goal's initiating event occurs. The structure of an agenda follows
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that of a goal hierarchy but carries additional task information. Figure 2 shows part of an agenda
corresponding to the goal hierarchy shown in Figure 1.
It Legtnd:
Task J]
Figure 2: Part of a Simple Agenda
When an initiating event occurs, the corresponding task becomes active. Since two or more tasks may share a
common initiating event and since one task may not reach completion before another task becomes active,
several tasks may be active at one time. Two or more tasks that are simultaneously active are called
concurrent tasks.
Resource-Limited Performance
Executing a task to achieve a system goal, such as to fly an aircraft to a destination, requires that certain
inputs be provided to that system over a time interval. These inputs must come from other systems or
subsystems, such as pilots, autopilots, and other cockpit equipment. These systems or subsystems are called
r_gfig..C.g.q_ and resources are required to complete a task. If the resources are not available, that is their
outputs cannot be directed to the primary system, the task cannot be completed satisfactorily and the goal
cannot be achieved.
A variety of resources are required for cockpit tasks. Equiomenl resour_:¢_/include autopilots, radios, displays
and controls. Human resour_:es include the pilot, f'trst officer, and flight engineer. Some resources are
specialized and can only be used for a limited set of tasks. Examples of specialized resources include the
landing gear control lever and the altimeter. Other resources are multi-function and can be used for a variety
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of tasks. Examples of these include multi-function CRT displays and humans.
Since resources are systems, they can be decomposed into simpler subsystems. Of particular interest are the
human resources, which can be decomposed into personal sensory, motor, and cognitive resources. Sensory
include visual, auditory, and other sensory systems which can be used to obtain external system
state information necessary for completing a task. Motor resources include hands, feet, voice, and other body
systems that can produce inputs to external systems..C,._I_J_¢._ are mental subsystems required to
perform cognitive tasks, such as those involving pattern recognition, problem solving, and decision making.
The resources include the verbal and spatial resources identified and studied by Wickens and his colleagues
at the University of Illinois [Wickens 1984; Wickens and Liu, 1988].
Since two concurrent tasks may require the same resources, this poses a potential problem, since resource
behavior compatible with achieving one goal may be incompatible with achieving the other goal and the
performance of one or more of the tasks may be degraded. That is, task performance is Umited by resource
availability. With resources like displays or hands and feet, this is obvious. But it is also true for cognitive
resources [Navon and Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 1984]. A situation in which task resource requirements exceed
resource availability is called a task conflict.
For example, given the agenda in F'_,ure 2, if ATC clearance to an approach waypoint is obtained the set and
maintain approach _r task would become active. Assume that this task requires a multifunction CRT
resource on which an engine display format must be shown. Suppose that now a primary electrical system
failure event occurs and a subtask to diagnose and corre, d el_ system becomes active. Assume that this
subtask requires an electrical system display format on the same CRT resource. If the two display formats
cannot be displayed simultaneouly a resource shortage and therefore a task conflict exists.
Even if two CRTs are available to complete both of these tasks simultaneously, there still might be a task
conflict due to cognitive resource limitations. Assuming for the purpose of this illustration that no other
crewmember is available to assist the pilot in completing these two tasks, he or she may lack sufficient
cognitive resources to simultaneously attend to both of them. This might result in errors in completing one or
both of the tasks.
Task conflicts like these can be partially resolved through a process of prioritization and resource allocation.
In the case outlined above, the pilot can decide that the immediate correction of equipment failure is
absolutely essential to the safe continuation of the flight, and temporarily suspend the set and maintain
approach po_er task, using all necessary resources to complete the diagnosis and correction subtask.
But if this subtask takes longer than anticipated, flight safety could be endangered, for if the aircraft proceeds
at the current altitude longer than the air traffic controller anticipated, the potential exists for collisions with
other aircraft travelling at the same altitude. Focussing on one task to the exclusion of others can lead to
poor task performance at minimum and disaster at worst.
Given the complex nature of modern aircraft, the speed at which they travel, and the increasing density of air
traffic in airspaces, the existence of multiple, concurrent tasks in the cockpit is the norm rather than the
exception. Clearly, concurrent tasks must be systematically managed by the aircrew to achieve acceptable
levels of system performance.
A Preliminary, Normative Theory of Cockpit Task Management
The process by which the alrcrew manages an agenda of cockpit tasks may be called Cockpit Task
Management (CTM). Given the requirement to allocate limited resources to tasks in a dynamic environment,
some essential functions of CTM are readily apparent. A brief outline of these functions are presented below
and a generalized procedure for CTM is shown in Exhibit 1. Please note that the following theory of CTM is
a normative one and presents the functions that should be completed. It does not seek, at this point, to
explain how they are performed, nor does it explidfly account for errors, which will be discussed later.
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Procedure: CTM
create and validate initial agenda
until mission goal is achieved or unachievable
activate tasks whose initiation events have occurred
assess status of active tasks
terminate tasks with achieved or unachievable goals
assess task resource requirements
pfioritize active tasks
allocate resources to tasks in order of priority:.
initiate higher priority tasks not yet in progress
interrupt lower priority tasks currently in progress
resume higher priority tasks that were interrupted
update and validate agenda
endUntil
End: CTM
Exhibit h Cockpit Task Management Procedure
Before CTM can begin, an initial planning process must be completed. This planning process yields a set of
goals, including a primary mission goal, a hierarchy of subgoals to the mission goal, and perhaps a collection
of goals to deal with contingency situations, such as an engine fire or a hydraulic system failure.
Agenda Creation is the f'rrst step of CTM and involves the selection and specification of a suitable task to
achieve each goal and the clef'tuition of the initiating event for each task. The specification of each task
indudes a list of resources necessary to complete the task, both equipment and human. The creation of the
agenda also requires the validation of the goals upon which the agenda is based. It is necessary to make sure
that all goals are compatible with the mission goal and with each other.
Once the agenda has been created and validated, true task management begins. This iterative process lasts
until the mission goal is achieved or it has been determined that the mission goal is not achievable and no
further effort need be expended towards achieving it.
Task Activation is the detection of the initiating event for a task and the recognition that the task should be
started. For the initial tasks in a mission, such as the taxi for takeoff task, this occurs immediately. For other
tasks, such as the fly to approach waypoint task, the initiating events and task activation may occur much
later in the mission. Some tasks for contingent goals, such as an extinguish engine fire task (a subtask of a
monitor aircraft and subsystems subtask), may never be activated.
Task Status Assessment or task monitoring determines the status of each task, which reflects the achievement
of the task's goal. Not only must the current status of the task be assessed, but if the task's goal is not yet
achieved, the status of the task must be projected into the future to determine the liklihood that the goal will
be achieved.
If the goal is achieved or if the goal has not yet been violated but current trends will likely result in the goal's
achievement, the status of the task is satisfactory. For example, suppose that fly to waypolnt 7 is an active
task. If the aircraft is at waypoint 7 the task's status is satisfactory. If the aircraft is not at waypoint 7, but it is
flying in that direction and there is sufficient fuel to reach the waypoint, the task's status is also satisfactory.
If the goal is not yet achieved, not yet violated, but current trends will likely result in a violation of the goal,
the status of the task is marginal. If fly to waypolnt 7 is active but the aircraft's course is 10 degrees to the
right of a heading to waypoint 7, the status of the task is marginal.
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If the goal is violated, the status of the task is critical. If the aircraft has passed waypoint 7, but has not come
within some acceptable range of the waypoint, the fly to _¢aypoinl 7 task is critical.
The above is a minimal classification scheme for task status. These status values probably should be treated
as general categories to be further subdivided to provide more resolution in status assessment.
Task Termination removes tasks from competition for resources. Normal task termination is a result of the
achievement of the task's goal. So when the aircraft is airborne, the takeoff task may be terminated.
A critical task, one whose goal cannot be achieve or at least probably cannot be achieved, may be aborted,
thereby terminating it. Such might be the case if dangerous wind shear conditions are detected during a land
task. When the possibility of aborting a task exists, the agenda should contain contingent tasks to replace the
aborted tasks. For example, an _e missed approach task should be included in an agenda to replace an
aborted land task.
Another reason for terminating a task is because its goal is no longer relevant. For example, if a landing gear
fails to operate properly on the first try, a diagnose/correct landing gear task might be initiated. If later,
through no direct action of the crew, the gear operates properly, the goal to diagnose and fLx the landing gear
would no longer be relevant and the task could be terminated.
Task Resource Reouirements Assessment must be performed to determine what resources are required to
complete the active tasks. Each task has minimum resource requirements, but in some cases, task
performance can be improved by providing additional resources. For example, the performance of a
diagnose[correct engine problem task might be improved by allocating two rather than one display resources
to it, allowing the simultaneous display of engine parameters on one display surface and an engine diagnosis
checklist on the other.
Recognizing the improved performance that additional resources can bring may be especially important in
correcting marginal or critical tasks. On the other hand, over-allocating resources to one task may interfere
with the performance of another, if those resources are limited.
Task Prioritization is an ordering of tasks by priority. Factors which can influence task priority include the
following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
the priority of the task's goal.
the priorities of the goals of other active tasks.
the current and projected status of the task.
the current and projected statuses of other active tasks.
Task prioritization can ultimately be defined in terms of a pairwise comparison of tasks based on the above
as well as other factors, which results in an ordering of active tasks. For example, suppose that both a
maintain _.+ 20 degrees roll task and a remain dear of terrain and other aircraft task are active. If the aircrew
detects another aircraft on a collision course, they should assign a higher priority to the second task than to
the f'trst because the goal to remain dear of terrain and other aircraft has greater importance and a higher
priority than the goal to maintain + 20 degrees roll
Resource Allocation is the assignment of resources to tasks, with preference given to high priority tasks, so
that the tasks may be executed. Resource allocation depends directly on task prioritization, and since that is a
dynamic process, resource allocation must be dynamic also.
When a newly activated task has a high enough priority, resources are allocated to it and task initiation
occurs. This means that the required resources begin exhibiting behaviors consistent with the achievement of
the task's goal. In many eases, task initiation requires a communication of the goal to some of the resources
so that they can behave accordingly. For example, if one of the resources required for a task is a human crew
member, that crew member must be aware of the goal in order to behave in such a way as to bring about its
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achievement. This is also true for some equipment resources. For example, to fly automatically to a certain
location, the aircraft's navigation computer must be "informed" of the goal by the input of the destination's
geographical coordinates.
If a lower priority task is in progress and a higher priority task is initiated which requires those resources,
then the resources are allocated to the higher priority task. This is called task interruption, and the lower
priority task, while still active, is no longer in progress, or it may said to be suspended.
When a high priority task in progress is terminated, for whatever reason, task resumntion of a lower priority,
suspended task can occur, in which case resources are reallocated back to the lower priority task and it can
continue.
Actually, resource allocation based merely on task priority may be insufficient. In some cases at least,
resource real.location may occur due to the specific status of a task. For example, the autopilot may be
allocated to a fly to approach waypoint task, but the autopiiot, due to existing conditions, may not be able to
adequately control the descent. It may then be necessary to deallocate the autopilot from the task and
allocate a human crewmember to it to achieve the goal.
is necessary since some cockpit tasks may alter the agenda. If bad weather or other
contingencies make a planned route infeasible or undesirable, a planning task may be initiated to change the
original route. This will, by necessity, change the agenda. The goals and tasks created by this planning task
must be integrated into the agenda, perhaps replacing earlier components. Of course, validation of the
candidate changes to the agenda must take place to assure that the mission goal is achieved and that no goal
conflicts occur.
Cockpit Task Management Failures
The significance of CTM can best be appreciated by using the framework presented above to examine several
aviation accidents and incidents which have occurred in the last two decades. The following accounts are
summaries from National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Accident Reports.
On March 21, 1980, at 1949, Eagle Commuter Airlines, Inc. Flight 108, a Piper PA-31-350,
with a pilot, a pilot-in-command trainee, and eight passengers on board, crashed on takeoff
from runway 22 at William P. Hobby Airport, Houston, Texas. The pilot, the pilot-in-
command trainee, and five passengers were killed, and three passengers were injured
seriously. The aircraft was destroyed by the crash and the postcrash fire. The National
Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was a power
loss in the right engine for undetermined reasons at a critical point in takeoff, the aircraft's
marginal single-engine performance capability, and the captain's incorrect emergency
response to the engine power loss when he failed to either land immediately on the
remaining runway or to configure the aircraft properly for the engine-out condition. [NTSB,
19811
An Eastern Airlines Lockheed L-1011 crashed at 2342 eastern standard time, December 29,
1972, 18.7 miles west-northwest of Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida. The aircraft
was destroyed. Of the 163 passengers and 13 crew'members aboard, 94 passengers and 5
crewmembers received fatal injuries. Two survivors died later as a result of their injuries.
Following a missed approach became of suspected nose gear malfunction, the aircraft
climbed to 2,000 feet mean sea level and proceeded on a westerly heading. The three flight
crewmembers and a jumpseat occupant became engrossed in the malfunction. The National
Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the
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failure of the flightcrew to monitor the flight instruments during the t'mal 4 minutes of flight,
and to detect an unexpected descent soon enough to prevent impact with the ground.
Preoccupation with a malfunction of the nose landing gear position indicating system
distracted the crew's attention from the instruments and allowed the descent to go
unnoticed. [NTSB, 1973]
On June 13, 1984, USAir, Inc. Flight 183, a McDonnell Douglas DC9-31, N964VJ, with 5
crewmembers and 51 passengers aboard, encountered turbulence, hail, and heavy rain as it
was making an instrument landing system approach to runway 21R at the Detroit
Metropolitan Airport, Detroit, Michigan. The airplane landed on the runway about 2500 feet
beyond the threshold of runway 21R before the landing gear was extended fully. The
airplane skidded bout 3,800 feet before sliding into the grass on the left side of the runway.
The crew and passengers were evacuated with only minor injuries. The airplane was
damaged substantially. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the
probable cause of the accident was inadequate cockpit coordination and management which
resulted in the captain's inappropriate decision to continue the instrument approach into
known thunderstorm activity where the airplane encountered severe wind shear. The failure
of air traffic control personnel at the airport to provide additional available weather
information deprived the flightcrew of information which may have enhanced their
decisionmaking process. INTSB, 1985]
Each of these accidents or incidents was thoroughly investigated by the NTSB, probable cause was assigned,
and contributing factors were identified. In the Eagle Commuter accident the captain "... failed to ... configure
the aircraft properly for the engine-out condition." "Preoccupation with a malfunction ... distracted the
[Eastern Airlines] crew's attention ..." The USAir captain made an '... inappropriate decision to continue the
instrument approach into known thunderstorm activity."
In each case conclusions can be and no doubt were drawn about how the accidents could have been
prevented. It is likely that these fixes, were they implemented, would have prevented similar accidents from
occurring. But specific explanations of and fixes to specific problems do not necessarily prevent accidents of
other types from occurring.
If, on the other hand, we examine these occurrences from the perspective of CTM, we can develop a more
comprehensive understanding of cockpit errors and perhaps suggest effective ways of preventing a wider
variety of accidents from occurring. With that in mind, consider the following, supplementary explanations of
the accidents and incidents, from the perspective of CTM.
Faced with multiple, possibly conflicting tasks, the Eagle Commuter captain failed to _ an engine-out
recovery task. The Eastern Airlines crew failed to monitor the status of the primary flight task, possibly
because they assigned too high a priority to the tasks of dealing with the malfunctions. The Eastern crew also
overallocated resources to the landing gear diagnosis task (all three crewmembers plus a jump seat occupant
became totally absorbed in the diagnosis). The USAir captain failed to _ the landing task, even
though continuation of the task placed the higher priority goal of passenger, crew, and aircraft safety at
extreme risk. _ =
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Pilot-Vehicle Interface Requirements to Facilitate
Cockpit Task Management
The concept of Cockpit Task Management has potential implications for aircrew training and cockpit
procedures, and these should be addressed. But our efforts in the past have focussed on cockpit automation,
especially the design and development of intelligent pilot-vehicle interfaces (PVIs). Based on the preliminary,
normative theory of CTM and the CTM-based analysis of a variety of accidents and incidents, we believe a
PVI should perform the foLlowing functions to facilitate CTM:
2.
3.
4.
5.
M_in_i_in an internal reoresentation of the mission a_,en__. The PVI should possess knowledge of the
agenda for each flight. Once the alrcrew has planned a mission, they must be able to create a
representation of the mission agenda in the PVI. They must also be able to modify the agenda
during the mission as plans change.
Disolav a_enda information to the aircrew. The PVI must provide a dynamic agenda display that
keeps the aircrew informed about the agenda. It should display information about the state of each
goal and the state and status of each task, especially those goals and tasks that are pending or active.
The aircrew may not choose to have the agenda display visible at all times, but it must be available
and easily accessible to them.
Monitor and distflav aircraft and subsystem states. All PVIs display aircraft and subsystem
information, but to facilitate CTM these displays should be controlled by the PVI to emphasize
information relevant to pending and active tasks.
Monitor task states and inform the aircrew. The PVI should monitor aircraft and subsystem state,
note events, and update the agenda. Specifically, the PVI should determine when tasks become
pending, active, or terminated. This information should be provided to the aircrew through the
agenda display and perhaps through other displays as well, especially when the agenda display is not
visible.
Determine when tasks are being performed. The PVI must be able to determine when tasks are
being performed by the alrcrew and by avionics systems. In some cases this may be done implicitly
by monitoring aircraft and subsystem states as they change under aircrew and avionics control
[Hoshstrasser and Geddes, 1989; Rouse and Hammar, 1990]. In other eases, airerew intent must be
determined by explicit communication from the aircrew that the task is or will soon be underway.
A_¢ss task status and inform the aircrew. The PVI should assess task status based on the present or
projected status of goals and inform the aircrew through appropriate displays. In the case of
marginal or critical tasks, the aircrew should be alerted and perhaps advised so that appropriate and
timely action can be taken to maximize the chances of goal achievement.
Prioritiz¢ tasks and inform the aircrew. Tasks should be prioritized by the PVI and the aircrew
should be informed through appropriate displays. Priorities of marginal or critical tasks should be
emphasized.
Help the airerew oerform strecific tasks. Although the major concern here is in facilitating CTM, the
functions described above virtually necessitate a PVI architecture that could also support specific task
aids, such as planning tools, computational aids, and expert systems for diagnosis and control. The
level of support provided by these aids should be selectable by the aircrew and the aids should
always remain under aircrew authority. Decisions and control actions provided by the aids should be
subject to airerew authorization, either in real time or by "contractual" arrangement prior to the
mission. It is likely that such aids could help improve individual task performance and indirectly
improve CYM performance by reducing the cognitive resource demands on the aircrew by the
individual tasks.
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We have made significant progress in our efforts to understand and facilitate CTM. Our primary
accomplishment to date is a prototype PVI and we are currently involved in both theoretical and applied
research and development efforts.
The Task Support Subsystem (TSS) is a prototype PVI developed at Oregon State University whose function,
in part, is to facilitate CTM [Funk, 1990]. It is a subsystem of an experimental avionics system that runs in a
simulated aircraft. Prior to a mission, a mission definition is created which defines the tasks to be
accomplished during the flight. During the simulated flight, software modules called Task Agents (TAs)
perform the CTM function to see that all tasks are completed satisfactorily.
For each task in the mission there is a TA assigned to it. The TA determines when the task should be started
and configures the cockpit for the task. It then monitors the pilot and aircraft subsystems to see that the task
is completed correctly and on time. If the pilot fails to act on the task, the TA reminds him via a display and
the TA alerts the pilot to actual or anticipated deviations from the task's goal. Most TAs also facilitate task
execution by providing procedural prompts and recommendations. Some TAs are capable of completely
automating their tasks at the pilot's discretion.
Multiple TAs are coordinated by a high level TA that allocates resources based on priority. A mission display
serves to remind the pilot of tasks to be completed and shows the status of each active task.
The TSS, as part of the avionics system, was evaluated by a group of 16 professional pilots in a simulator
experiment [Lind et al, 1989]. Each pilot flew two equivalent, simulated missions, one in a baseline cockpit
and one with the TSS present. Performance measures involved timing accuracy and number of errors
committed. Statistically significant results favoring the TSS-equipped cockp!t were obtained from the data
analysis and pilots subjectively rated the TSS-equlpped cockpit as superior m terms of situational awareness
and workload. Subsequent informal evaluation of the TSS by a variety of pilots and non-pilots have been
consistent with the positive results of the experiment.
Our ongoing research involves development of theories of CTM and development of further prototype PVIs
to facilitate CTM.
The preliminary, normative theory sketched above is being formalized in the framework of mathematical
systems theory [Mesarovic and Takahara, 1975; Funk, 1983]. A simulation model will be developed and
validated for internal consistency before finalizing a procedural description of CTM.
The normative theory will serve as the basis for a descriptive theory of CTM which identifies human
capabilities and limitations in performing CTM functions. From the descriptive theory will come an error
taxonomy, a framework for explaining CTM errors, and a model for predicting CTM performance.
Both theories will be further formalized to create analytic and evaluative methodologies which will be applied
to the examination of aviation incidents and accidents from the perspective of CTM and the rating of cockpit
equipment and procedures for how they facilitate or impair CTM. We believe that the development and
application of these methodologies will also lead to countermeasures to poor CTM, perhaps in the form of
general principles as well as specific design guidelines along the lines of those presented above.
From these principles and guidelines we will construct and evaluate further prototype PVIs. Our goal is not
just to understand CTM, but to improve it through intelligent engineering research and practice.
We are encouraged by our progress and believe that the CTM concept has significant potential for improving
the safety and effectiveness of aerospace systems.
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